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RURAL CREDIT FOR RESOURCE-POOR ENTREPRENEURS: LESSONS FROM THE 
ERITREAN EXPERIENCE 
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1 
Abstract  
Developing  countries’  small-scale  farmers  lack  access  to  financial  services.  In  the  Eritrean 
Savings  and  Micro-  Credit  program  (SMCP),  solidarity  groups  are  jointly  responsible  for 
individual members’ loans; this reduces transaction costs, improves repayment and substitutes 
for collateral. Performance of SMCP (1996 to 2002) indicates low arrears and good repayment, 
but not satisfactory saving mobilization. SMCP service reached many people previously without 
access to financial services, thus materially improving individuals’ economic self-confidence and 
independence, cash holdings and household living standards. It has had favourable social spin-
offs; a well-designed village-banking model can help solve economic problems of the poor. 
 
1. NTRODUCTION 
Small  farmers  in  developing  countries  experience  scarcity  of  capital.  Formal  financial 
institutions are reluctant to provide loans to small farmers. This market is perceived as risky and 
often  not  viable:  Opportunity  costs  often  outweigh  expected  profits.  The  causes  are  small 
farmers’ lack of collateral, high default rates, high transaction costs and high average operating 
costs involved with large numbers of small loans (Spio, 1994). In most countries the formal 
financial  sector  is  regulated  by  banking  law    whereas  the  informal  sector  operates  without 
statutory regulation and supervision. Approximately 60% of financial transactions in developing 
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countries  rural  areas  are  done  within  this  sector.  Relatives,  neighbours,  professional 
moneylenders, and rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCA’s) are the most important 
sources of informal credit (Adams and Fitchett, 1992). 
 
Eritrea  is  a  poverty-stricken,  newly  independent  and  war  ravaged  country  with  serious 
agricultural development problems (Abubakar and Groenewald, 2003). The Saving and Micro-
Credit Program (SMCP) is a system of providing financial services to the poor. 
2.  THE SAVINGS AND MICRO-CREDIT PROGRAM (SMCP) 
2.1.  General 
The aim of the SMCP is mainly to provide financial services to vulnerable groups, both rural and 
urban, without access to formal banking services. The SMCP has a two-pronged approach to 
promote  micro-enterprises.  Grassroots-based  solidarity  groups  owing  and  operating  "Village 
Banks" form the backbone of one part of the program, called Tier I. Beneficiaries belonging to 
this category generally need short-term micro-loans not exceeding Nakfa 10,000 per loan. Most 
Tier I clients use the loans either to meet working capital needs or to expand business operations; 
they constitute over 90 % of SMCP clients. Individual entrepreneurs whose requirements cannot 
be met through the Tier I facility have access to a Tier II window, intended to enable individual 
and group clients, without recourse to Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBER) stipulated collateral, 
to borrow up to Nakfa 100,000. Although they constitute only 10 % of the client base, Tier II 
clients have absorbed up to 42 % of the SMCP loan fund. 
2.2.  Collateral/loan security 
The SMCP is a Solidarity Group (SG) based lending program, involving groups in which some 
or all members are jointly liable for each individual’s loans instead of individual loan collateral 4 
requirements. No new loans are provided until all outstanding loans of the group are repaid. 
Solidarity  group  members  moreover  become  eligible  for  further  loans  only  after  having 
successfully accumulated 10% mandatory savings within three months. Mandatory savings are 
normally deposited in a local commercial bank account opened in the name of the village or 
group and will be used to honour unpaid commitments in case of default.  
2.3.  Interest rates 
SMCP annual interest rates have been 16% for Tier I clients and 14% for Tier II clients, higher 
than those of most other micro-lending institutions in Eritrea. Real interest rates over inflation 
ranged from –0.005% to +0.012% (Annual Report of SMCP, 2001).  
Financial  and  institutional  sustainability  are  not  always  synonymous.  Long-term  institutional 
sustainability  may  be  financially  costly  in  the  short-term  (Johnson  and  Rogaly,  1997).  The 
operating profit of the SMCP grew from Nakfa 12,409.00 (second half of 1996) to Nakfa 5.2 
million (last quarter of 2001). However, this does not necessarily reflect the true surplus, as the 
SMCP still receives subsidies from donors and the government of Eritrea.  
2.4.  Target beneficiaries and credit delivery mechanism 
SMCP Tier I and II saving and credit services are open to all citizens excluded from access to 
services of commercial banks and other financial institutions. The potential clients - people in the 
informal sector - are about 250,000 people (SMCP project document, 2002), supporting over 1.2 
million persons. By economic activity, loans distributions have been: Tier I: Agriculture 38.6%, 
Service 3.8%, Trade 56%, and Manufacturing 1.6%. And Tier II: Agriculture 38.06%, Service 
14.04%, Trade 43.27%, and Manufacturing 4.62%. An important target group consists of women 
farmers and entrepreneurs who have the potential to expand the local economy while at the same 
time improve their own standard of living.  5 
2.5.  Group formation, loan size and term, and loan conditions 
Only members of SG‘s consisting of 3 to 7 members are eligible for SMCP credit. Prerequisites 
for SG’s include: 
·  The SG has to be formed voluntarily by individuals with the same understanding of the 
program and who trust each other; 
·  A SG may not have more than one member from the same nuclear family, but different 
members of the same family can join different SGs; 
·  The group has to be formed from the same community/town; and 
·  When different repayment due dates and loan sizes occur, SG members must decide and 
negotiate  between  each  other  on  the  ways  and  means  of  avoiding  complications. 
Generally, it is preferable for solidarity group members to have a similar capacity to 
utilize the loans extended.  
Tier I has seven loan cycles and loan sizes increase gradually. The first loan cycle starts with 
Nakfa 1,000. Eligible borrowers may request amounts below the designed ceiling. Receiving the 
subsequent loan will be contingent upon the repayment of the previous loan by all SG members. 
SMCP loan sizes and maturities are indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1 
The usual Tier I borrower generally starts at cycle I and works his way up to cycle 7. Fresh 
borrowers  may  in  some  cases  enter  the  program  at  later  cycles.  The  loan  repayment  period 
presented in Table 1 is only indicative. Some flexibility must be built in for repayments terms to 
reflect reality. A grace period (pegged cash flow) may be allowed depending on the nature of the 
investment. The loan life should also reflect the nature of the business activity; grain trade and 6 
sheep/goat fattening generate revenue faster than raising dairy calves or erecting a vegetable oil 
expeller project. 
3.  PERFORMANCE OF THE SMCP PROGRAM  
3.1. Loan repayment 
Table 2 shows indicators of portfolio quality, including repayment rate, reserve rate, portfolio at 
risk, loan loss rate etc.  
Table 2 
Portfolio in arrears indicates amounts of loan payments past due. These values are favourable, 
varying  between  1.15%  and  9.36%  this  success  is  attributed  to  close  monitoring  of  loan 
performance,  a  high  degree  of  management  autonomy,  strong  social  pressure,  incentives  for 
higher loans, as well as innovative and flexible loan terms and conditions. A high repayment 
rate, varying from 100% to 92.5%, also indicates good performance. The 2002 repayment rate 
was 92.5% - a decrease of 4.13% from the previous year, caused by severe drought.  
3.2.  Saving mobilization 
To become eligible for borrowing, SMCP requires applicants to save 10% of the proposed loan 
amount.  This  compulsory  saving  is  important  as  it  enables  SMCP  to  assess  the  ability  and 
commitment of the potential client to make repayments. SMCP deposits the savings with the 
Commercial Bank of Eritrea (CBER) in the village bank’s name. The account is administered by 
SMCP regional accountants and the village bank chairman on the behalf of the clients. The 
CBER pays 6% interest on these deposits.  
 
Voluntary saving mobilization is an integral part of the program; however, Table 3 indicates 
limited  success  in  this  respect  (ECOSOC  et  al,  2000).  At  December,  2002  mandatory  and 7 
voluntary savings amounted to Nakfa 2,963,609.27 - 15.38% of the outstanding loan balance of 
Tier I. Average saving per client was Naka 262.97. The ratio of savers to borrowers is 1:1. 
Individual,  voluntary,  and  open-access  savings  accounts  have  proved  most  successful  in 
attracting  savers.  Mandatory  savings  have  achieved  services  higher  outreach  than  voluntary 
deposits.  Table 3 shows saving mobilization by SMCP. 
Table 3 
3.3 The effectiveness of rural credit service 
According  to  a  World  Bank  analysis  (2002),  SMCP  services  were  provided  to  11,800 
individuals, 36 % of which being women. Many used loan funds to improve their livelihood and 
increase their self-confidence and economic independence by 20 %; clients with a cash holding 
of  Nakfa  10,000(US$741)  increased  by  at  least  50  %,  and  average  monthly  household 
expenditure of clients increased by 24 %. The SMCP provides a platform for institution building, 
notably through strengthening the capacity of village administrations to manage village-based 
saving and micro credit service programs. The organization of the village banking model (with 
its  underlying  solidarity  group  structure)  promoted  community  cohesiveness,  highlighted  the 
importance of collective action and accountability by members in servicing and repaying loans, 
and strengthened the interaction and relations between the village administrator vis-a-vis credit 
committee members, the village bank membership, and even the rest of the village residences.  
SMCP credit furthermore contributed towards employment through income generating activities. 
3.4.  Major operational problems and constraints in rural credit 
The following problems have complicated rural credit development, including the SMCP. 
War  /Border  conflict  between  Ethiopia  and  Eritrea:  The  border  conflict  with  Ethiopia 
aggravated  an  already  difficult  situation  of  reintegrating  nearly  half  a  million  refugees  and 8 
demobilizing over 100,000 since independence in 1993. After May 1998, approximately 250,000 
people were displaced and over 64,000 deported from Ethiopia to Eritrea. This compounded the 
challenges of reintegrating these groups into an already strained economy. Approximately one 
third of the deported came from rural areas, and must be resettled eventually. The war also 
caused infrastructure damage in affected areas and a cumulative death of between 50,000 and 
70,000  from  both  sides  (Nagan,  2002).  Socio-economic  infrastructure  and  services  of 
approximately  200  villages  were  destroyed  and  have  to  be  rehabilitated 
(www.wds.worldbank.org).  
Default  problems:  In  some  regions  borrowers  developed  the  attitude  of  expecting  debt 
rescheduling or write-offs and of regarding the loans as government  grants.  If loans are not 
repaid according to schedule, funds will be tied arrears and the bank will face shortages of loan 
funds. 
Accessibility:  From  the  lenders’  point  of  view  the  large  number  of  scattered  small  size 
applications, the difficulty conducting follow-up visits to each borrower, and the expense cost of 
loan administration are major constraints in reaching the rural people. 
Backward  technology:  Rural  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  production  systems  are 
traditional with stagnant technology and characterized by low productivity resulting from lack of 
knowledge of modern techniques and of improper production practices.  
Inadequate  infrastructure:  A  country  with  an  area  of  124,320  sq.  km  has  only  3,850  km 
highways; 810 km is paved, the other 3040 km not (CIA, 2001). Due to the lack of transportation 
and communication facilities in rural areas, branch offices of the banks have been established 
only in major towns. 9 
Inadequate  provision  of  complementary  services:  The  provision  of  extension  services  is 
inadequate,  not  only  due  to  shortage  of  skilled  manpower  but  also  due  to  lack  of  mobility. 
Marketing services for output are insufficient, causing farmers not to have bargaining power.  
Lack of co-ordination among the Financial Government, Non-Government institutions and 
line  ministries:  Coordination  among  the  concerned  ministries  and  non-government 
organizations involved in development programs and the financial institutions is weak in several 
regions and non-existent in some others. This renders it difficult to achieve proper utilization of 
credit and its contribution to development.  
Legal constraints and the lack of appropriate regulatory and supervision: Many countries, 
particularly developing countries, have limited capacity to regulate and supervise the traditional 
and also the formal financial sector. These Institutions are not regulated and often not allowed to 
mobilize  client  savings  (Campion,  2000).  The  SMCP  is  legally  constrained  in  its  effort  to 
mobilize  savings  from  the  public;  the  legal  framework  governing  the  rural  credit  sector 
(licensing supervision and monitoring) is yet to be developed. There is no uniform registration or 
licensing procedure for rural credit in Eritrea. 
4. LESSONS LEARNED 
·  The  village-banking  model  can  promote  community  cohesiveness  and  community 
driven  micro-finance  development.  Close  collaboration  with  lower  level 
administrative  structures  also  provide  a  dynamic  foundation  for  strengthening  the 
institutional development of community driven micro-finance development.  
·  By promoting local governance, transparency, accountability, local capacity building 
and  sustainability  of  local  services,  community  based  projects  can  contribute  to 10 
broader efforts to decentralize the provision of public goods and services in a way 
that also helps local government to fight poverty. 
·  Efforts  to  build  on  existing  institutional  structures  should  be  complemented  by 
explicit measures such as greater community mobilization, information dissemination 
and targeted capacity building to ensure that the institutions function in an effective, 
inclusive, and participatory manner. 
·  Clear  mechanisms  and  incentives  need  to  be  established  up-front  to  facilitate  the 
achievement  of  the  less  visible  objectives  of  institutional  development  and 
sustainability. The trade-offs between the physical and more qualitative output targets 
need to be confronted in the project design stage and the hierarchy of objectives needs 
to be defined and established up-front. Explicit measures are needed to compensate 
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Table 1: SMCP Loan Sizes and Maturities (currency is in Nakfa) 









1  750  3 month  750  1000  3-12 month 
2  1500  6 month  1500  2000  3-12 month 
3  3000  12 month  2250  3000  3-12 month 
4  6000  24 month  3000  5000  3-12 month 
5      4000  7000  3-24 months  
6      5000  8500   
7      6000  10,000   
Source: Annual Report of SMCP (data base of SMCP) 
Eritrea’s official exchange rate year 1996:1US$=Nakfa 6.70; year 1997:1US$=Nakfa 7.20; year 1998:1US$=Nakfa 7.40; year 




Table 2: Indicators of portfolio quality 
Indicators  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Repayment rate  100%  98.85%  97.96%  92.88%  94.04%  96.63%  92.5% 
Average  of  un  paid 
loans  
(past due) 
-  43,495.5  181,194.81  653,974.89  552,187.17  1,073,117.79   
Reserve rate 




0  1.15  2.04  7.12  5.96  2.71  9.36 
Portfolio at risk 
c  0.00  1.28  2.09  7.48  6.33  3.37  7.5 
Loan loss rate 
d  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  14% 
Average  of  disbursed 
loans Tier I 
1,370,600  6,364,550  13,894,050  9,429,800  7,018,350  19,799,570   
Average  of  disbursed 
loans Tier II 
-  66,755  635,179  302,263  2,681,145.33  14,695,553   
a loan reserve(Calculated for loans with payments past due/portfolio outstanding) 
b payment past due/portfolio outstanding 
c outstanding balance with payments past due/portfolio outstanding   
d.write offs (cumulative)/portfolio outstanding  













Table 3: Saving Mobilization 
             As of Dec.,2002 
         
Saving 
Region  Mandatory   Voluntary   Interest   Total 
Debub  452,476.25  1,417.00 30,154.01 484,047.26
Anseba  446,464.00    76,374.66 522,838.66
Maekel  472,771.52  61,121.40 61,591.42 595,484.34
Gash Barka  443,330.67  660.40 67,111.13 511,102.20
S/K/B  415,431.21    54,888.92 470,320.13
D/K/B  125,800.00   125,800.00
Total Program of 2002  199,979.88 
                                  
           3,550.00              50,486.80   254,016.68
Total  2,556,253.53  66,748.80 340,606.94 2,936,609.27
Source: Annual report of SMCP 